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COMMENT
Uncovering the Codifier's Canon: How Codification
Informs Interpretation
To contend that the category of "tangible objects" should be understood to
exclude an actual fish, one must marshal some strong arguments. The ordinary
meaning of a textual phrase in a statute is often the most persuasive evidence in
favor of a particular interpretation. An interpretation at odds with ordinary
meaning requires citing textual or other clues of nearly equal interpretive force.
In Yates v. United States, the Supreme Court narrowed the meaning of the word
"tangible object" in 18 U.S.C. § 1519, in part by citing the language's organiza-
tional context in the United States Code, including its caption and the function
of the surrounding provisions.2 In doing so, it implicitly placed arguments based
on the organization of the Code on a high pedestal, possibly above legislative
history and substantive policy canons, like the rule of lenity.'
Setting aside the question of how much relative weight these organizational
features should be accorded, it seems reasonable that any interpreter - regardless
of where she or he stands in the textualist-purposivist debate - ought at least to
consider what information might be communicated by Congress's decision to
place a provision in a particular part of the Code and give it a particular title.4
1. See, e.g., Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (rejecting the petitioners' inter-
pretation of the relevant statute as "ignor[ing] the ordinary meaning of plain language").
2. 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1083-84 (2015) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)).
3. Although the plurality references both the rule of lenity and legislative history, they are given
less weight than the heading and placement in the Code. The rule of lenity is invoked only at
the end of the opinion and is introduced as applying only "if our recourse to traditional tools
of statutory construction leaves any doubt about the meaning of 'tangible object,' as that term
is used in § 1519." Id. at io88. Legislative history appears in the plurality's opinion to note that
§ 1519 was drafted before § 1512(c)(1), a fact that the plurality uses in its broader argument
about the relevance of the provision's placement. Id. at 1084.
4. See, e.g., WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., PHILIP P. FRIicKY & ELIZABETH GARRETT, LEGISLATION
AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION 264 (2000) (" [T]here might be greater legal legitimacy, as
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But while invoking these contextual features might seem uncontroversial, the
text of the Code itself says otherwise. Unbeknownst to most interpreters, Title
18, along with many other titles, includes a rule of construction that appears to
forbid invoking either a provision's placement or its caption in the Code.' This
feature of the Code affects both dominant schools of interpretation: the textual-
ist move of constructing coherence in the Code is short-circuited,6 and a staple
of the purposivist's approach is foreclosed.'
In other words, this rule of construction seems to command that, far from
being strong enough to overcome ordinary meaning, an argument based on or-
ganizational features of the Code is invalid. Such a conclusion, this Comment
argues, relies on a mistaken interpretation of what this statutory rule of con-
struction-or "legislated canon" -means. This Comment theorizes that provi-
sions that guide interpreters' reading of codification information embody a "cod-
ifier's canon": an interpretive principle that judges should heed caption and
placement in the Code where they reflect the choices of Congress, but not where
they are introduced by nonlegislative codifiers. This novel understanding of the
well as an aesthetic advantage, if courts presume coherence among statutes as well as within
statutes."); Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law, 1989
DuKE L.J. 511, 521 (" [T]he meaning of a statute is apparent from its text and from its relation-
ship with other laws.").
5. Act of Sept. 6, 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-554, § 7(e), 80 Stat. 378, 631 (codified at 5 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 1o (2012)); Act of Aug. io, 1956, Pub. L. No. 84-1028, § 49(e), 7oA Stat. 1, 640
(codified at 10 U.S.C. Front Matter at 12 (2012)); Act of Aug. 31, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83-740, § 5,
68 Stat. 1012, 1025 (codified at 13 U.S.C. Front Matter at 1 (2012)); Act of Aug. 4, 1949, Pub.
L. No. 81-207, § 3, 63 Stat. 495, 557 (codified at 14 U.S.C. Front Matter at 2-3 (2012)); Act of
June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Front Matter
at 5 (2012)); Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991 (28 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 5 (2012)); Act of Sept. 13, 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-258, § 4(e), 96 Stat. 877, 1c67 (cod-
ified at 31 U.S.C. Front Matter at 6 (2012)); Act of Nov. 3, 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-354, §4(e),
112 Stat. 3238, 3245 (codified at 36 U.S.C. Front Matter at 11 (2012)); Act of Aug. 12, 1970, Pub.
L. No. 91-375, § 11(b), 84 Stat. 719, 785 (codified at 39 U.S.C. Front Matter at 7 (2012)); Act
of Aug. 21, 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-217, § 5(f), 116 Stat. 1062, 1304 (codified at 40 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 7 (2012)); Act ofOct. 22, 1968, Pub L. No. 90-620, § 2(e), 82 Stat. 1238, 1306 (cod-
ified at 44 U.S.C. Front Matter at 3 (2012)); Act of Aug. 26, 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-89, § 2(e),
97 Stat. 5oo, 598 (codified at46 U.S.C. Front Matter at lo (2012), applying to subtitle II); Act
of Nov. 23, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-710, § io5(d), 102 Stat. 4735, 4751 (codified at 46 U.S.C.
Front Matter at lo (2012), applying to subtitle III); Act of Oct. 17, 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-473,
§ 3(e), 92 Stat. 1337, 1466 (codified at 49 U.S.C. Front Matter at 14 (2012)).
6. See W. Va. Univ. Hosps., Inc. v. Casey, 499 U.S. 83, 100 (1991) (characterizing the role of the
Court as defining a meaning that fits "logically and comfortably" with the statute in question
and the broader Code).
7. See, e.g., Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892) (relying on the
title and preamble of a statute to construe the term "labor" in a purposive manner, while ac-
knowledging the tension with the text's ordinary meaning).
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apparent prohibition on utilizing captions and placement offers important les-
sons for how interpreters should consider the codification process when extract-
ing meaning from statutory provisions.
As Tobias Dorsey, a former attorney for the House Office of Legislative
Counsel, has observed, the provision in Title 18 and elsewhere has gone largely
unheeded; citing placement and captions remains the norm in the judiciary.' In
fact, the Supreme Court has only once cited one of these statutory prohibitions
against invoking caption and structure.' In Ex parte Collett, the Court rejected
the interpretation that a provision addressing venue transfer applied exclusively
to the particular types of civil suits discussed in neighboring provisions. o While
relying primarily on the plain meaning of the text, which referenced "any civil
action," the Court also cited the provision that prohibited drawing conclusions
based on where in Title 28 the statute was codified."
Scholars have offered three related approaches to the problem of inconsistent
invocation of organizational context. Gregory Sisk has called for the repeal of
provisions banning invocation of placement and captions, contending that they
seal off important interpretive resources from judicial consideration.12 On the
other hand, Dorsey advocates adherence to such rules as legitimate acts of legis-
lation." Most recently, William Eskridge has advocated treating this legislated
direction as nonbinding, while suggesting that it provides a "note of caution" for
interpreters looking at a provision's context in the code.14 Although Sisk, Dorsey,
and Eskridge take distinct attitudes toward the legislated prohibition, they all
8. Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Reflections on Yates and the Statutes We Threw Away, 18 GREEN BAG 2D
377, 382 (2015).
9. See Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 57-59 (1949). Note that this Comment excludes cases citing
I.R.C. § 7 8o6(b), which is similar to the codifier's canon in that it prohibits inferences based
on captions and placement, among other things. The Court has cited and discussed that pro-
vision and its relationship to the codification process. See United States v. Dixon, 347 U.S. 381,
385-86 (1954); see also Dorsey, supra note 8, at 382-83 (discussing Dixon). However, § 7 8o6(b)
is different in both text and function from the codifier's canon. It is worded much more
broadly in its application and appears in Title 26, which is not a positive law title and contains
the text of the Internal Revenue Code. These factors make Title 26 a unique case, but further
analysis is beyond the scope of this Comment. For a discussion of the differences between
positive law and nonpositive law titles, see infra notes 15-17 and accompanying text.
io. Collett, 337 U.S. at 57-59.
ii. Id. (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) (20o6) and citing Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-
773, 62 Stat. 869 (revising and codifying Title 28)).
12. See Gregory C. Sisk, Lifting the Blindfold from Lady Justice: Allowing Judges To See the Structure
in the Judicial Code, 62 FLA. L. REv. 457 (2010).
13. See Dorsey, supra note 8, at 386.
14. See WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR., INTERPRETING LAw: A PRIMERON How To READ STATUTES AND
THE CONSTITUTION 120 (2016).
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interpret the rules of construction as meaning the same thing -that is, as an in-
struction by Congress not to draw interpretive inferences based on where a pro-
vision was placed in the Code or what caption it was given. All of these argu-
ments, this Comment contends, start from the wrong premise.
This Comment offers an alternative interpretation of these statutorily en-
acted rules of interpretation. These provisions ought not to be read as broad re-
jections of citing structural placement or caption. Instead, they should be under-
stood as signaling to the courts that placement and caption choices within the
Code should be respected and considered when they originate in the decisions
of Congress, but not when those choices are the result of intervention by the
office that codifies the United States Code. In other words, the apparent prohi-
bition on invoking organizational context should be understood as tailored to
the circumstances of the codification process, not a categorical rejection of the
salience of placement and caption.
This observation is informed by the codification process. The United States
Code is a project of compilation and codification of federal statutes that has been
ongoing for generations. Central to that project is the Office of the Law Revision
Counsel (OLRC). The OLRC is tasked with preparing and publishing the
Code." The Code is itself composed of both positive law titles and nonpositive
law titles, and the role of the OLRC differs with respect to each type of title, as
is elaborated in this Comment. Nonpositive law titles are not themselves binding
authorities. This is because, although they are composed of statutory provisions
passed by Congress, the titles have not been independently enacted into law.16
Positive law titles are like nonpositive law titles in that they compile and restate
previously enacted federal statutes, but there is one major difference: a positive
law title is itself enacted into law as a statute that also repeals the existing laws
that the positive law title restates."
The codifier's canon only appears in positive law titles. That is because of the
role of the OLRC in the positive law codification process. The OLRC is the crit-
ical player in the enactment of a positive law title, a process that requires decision
making about the placement of provisions and, sometimes, captions. The codi-
fier's canon - that is, the prohibition on invoking organizational context - ought
to be understood as responding directly to the role of the OLRC, barring reliance
on those decisions made during the codification process, but not those that re-
flect legislative choice. It is the close relationship between these legislated rules
15. About the United States Code and This Website, OFF. L. REVISION COUNS., http://uscode.house
.gov/aboutcode.xhtml [http://perma.cc/2NYW-32U3].
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and those who codify statutes into the United State Code that motivates refer-
ring to this interpretive principle as the "codifier's canon."
But not every captioning and placement decision is made by the OLRC. Of-
ten, Congress makes those choices as part of the statute as it was enacted. In
particular, every statute enacted by Congress amending a positive law title in-
cludes specific directions about how the provisions relevant to the statute ought
to be arranged in the U.S. Code. The codifier's canon should not be understood
to impede an interpreter from drawing inferences from Congress's statutorily
enacted choices about placement and captions.
Instead, the interpreter ought to follow a simple rule: ignore editorial deci-
sions made by the nonlegislative codifiers-i.e., the OLRC-but consider those
made by Congress. This broad principle of interpretation - the generic codifier's
canon - ought to be considered regardless of whether the provision one is inter-
preting appears in a title in which the prohibition on citing captions and place-
ment is present in the text of the title itself. The generic codifier's canon should
be - and arguably already has been" - added to the Supreme Court's litany of
canons of statutory interpretation. The canons of statutory interpretation are
"formal presumptions or rules about statutory meaning."" The generic codifier's
canon should be recognized as such a rule because doing so would avoid inaccu-
rate interpretations based on artifacts of the codification process - an error that
does, in fact, occur in the federal courts.20 As this Comment explains, under-
standing how the OLRC generates both positive and nonpositive law titles ena-
bles the interpreter to better determine the meaning of the law as Congress in-
tended it.
On the other hand, where the legislated codifier's canon -which is referred to
here as simply the "codifier's canon," as it is the focus of this Comment21 - ap-
pears as a statutorily enacted rule, it has a special and important meaning. The
inclusion of the codifier's canon in a positive law title directs the interpreter not
to draw inferences from editorial decisions made by the OLRC or one of its pre-
decessor institutions during the positive law codification process. Unlike the ge-
neric codifier's canon, this is not just a helpful principle to increase the fidelity of
18. See infra note 99 and accompanying text.
ig. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Norms, Empiricism, and Canons in Statutory Interpretation, 66 U. CHI.
L. REV. 671, 673 (1999).
20. See infra notes 70-73 and accompanying text.
21. The legislated codifier's canon is the statutory text directing that interpreters ought not to draw
inferences from a provision's caption or placement in the Code. In contrast, the generic codi-
fier's canon is simply the principle that interpreters should distinguish between aspects of the
Code that reflect the choices of Congress and those that reflect those ofthe OLRC. This Com-
ment argues that the legislated codifier's canon should be understood as reflecting the general
principle instantiated in the generic codifier's canon.
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one's interpretation to Congress's will; rather, the statutory inclusion of the cod-
ifier's canon prevents inadvertent substantive changes introduced through the
positive law codification process from gaining formal legal significance.
This Comment argues in favor of this tailored interpretation of the codifier's
canon. Part I provides a general account of legislated canons in statutory inter-
pretation. Part II introduces the codifier's canon, examining it in relation to the
Court's standard methodology of finding significance in a provision's placement
and caption in the Code. Part III explains the role of the OLRC in the codification
process. Part IV builds on the history of the codifier's canon and the function of
the OLRC to explain how the codifier's canon should be understood. Finally,
PartV applies these insights to the statutory provision at the center of the dispute
in Yates v. United States, illustrating the circumstances under which a provisions
captioning and placement may be legitimately invoked.
I. LEGISLATED CANONS AND INTERBRANCH UNDERSTANDING
To understand the codifier's canon, it is useful to contextualize it within the
broader field of statutory interpretation. An outside observer, even one comfort-
able with legal reasoning, might be caught off guard reading the Justices' opin-
ions in a divisive statutory interpretation case like Lockhart v. United States. 22 In
that case, the debate between the majority and dissent made heavy use of archaic-
sounding terms and spoke little about what Members of Congress would have
thought about the issue. A growing body of literature has expressed concern with
this interpretive methodology, pointing out the disconnect between the Justices'
canon-based interpretations and the way Congress produces legislation.23
Among the most significant observations is that many of the Court's textual in-
terpretive canons - rules of thumb for drawing meaning from sometimes minute
details of text24 - do not align with the assumptions of the people who actually
draft statutes. 25 Drafters include the House and Senate Offices of Legislative
22. 136 S. Ct. 958 (2016).
23. See, e.g., ROBERT A. IATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014); Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside -An Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting,
Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901 (2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman
(pt. 1)]; Abbe R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside -An
Empirical Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV.
725 (2014) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman (pt. 2)]; Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of
Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012).
24. Textual interpretive canons are a distinct subset of the larger body of canons regularly refer-
enced by the Court. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 407-45 (categorizing each of the Court's
various canons as either "textual canons," "extrinsic source canons," or "substantive policy
canons," with the majority falling into the third category).
25. See Gluck & Bressman (pt. 1), supra note 23, at 905.
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Counsel, the nonpartisan professional drafting offices that write much of the
statutory text.2 6 The misalignment between Congress and the Court's respective
practices suggests a need for better interbranch communication if the judiciary
is going to enforce the law as Congress intended.27
In fact, Congress does engage in explicit communication, but the judiciary
has, at times, failed to heed it. While exchanging esoteric rules, the Supreme
Court has largely ignored legislated canons, Congress's statutorily enacted in-
structions about how to interpret a law. For example, the Racketeer Influenced
and Corrupt Organization Act (RICO) includes a provision that instructs courts
to construe the title "liberally" in order "to effectuate its remedial purposes."28
The Court has given weight to some of these rules of construction. For example,
in Russello v. United States, the Court cited the RICO provision along with legis-
lative history in support of a broad reading of the statute.2 9 But this is an anom-
aly. On the whole, the Court has ignored these congressional directions.o
The Court's failure to abide by congressional instructions on how to inter-
pret statutes is a troubling development -although how troubling depends in
part on one's perspective on legislated canons. As Eskridge has argued, the can-
ons of statutory interpretation are not mere rules for mechanically drawing out
meaning from text, a point made clear by the enormous number of substantive
canons routinely cited by the Court." Instead, the canons are best understood
as part of an "interpretive regime" formed through centuries of judicial practice
26. Id. at 908.
27. See KATZMANN, supra note 23, at 54 (arguing that courts need to have "a better understanding
of the legislative process and its rules, and [should] appreciat[e] the internal hierarchy of
communications" (footnote omitted)). Others, however, resist the position that the judiciary
should be the branch striving to communicate Congress's intent, arguing instead that Con-
gress bears the constitutional responsibility of legislating. See, e.g., ANTONIN SCALA, A MAT-
TEROF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAw 17 (Amy Gutmiann ed., 1998) ("It is
the law that governs, not the intent of the lawgiver.").
28. Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 904(a), 84 Stat. 922, 947 (1970)
(amending RICO, Pub. L. No. 91-452, 84 Stat. 941 (1970)).
29. 464 U.S. 16, 26-27 (1983) (interpreting "interests" to include not only a defendant's property
or ownership interests in an enterprise, but also the "profits or proceeds" from the enterprise);
see also WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., STATUTES, REGULATIONS, AND INTERPRETATION:
LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF STATUTES 595-96 (2014) (discussing
potential constitutional objections to statutory rules of construction, including the RICO pro-
vision, on the basis of violating separation-of-powers doctrine).
30. See Dorsey, supra note 8, at 378 (arguing that the Court has ignored congressional directions
regarding the proper interpretation of a specific statute).
31. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 14, at 11-13.
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and intended to advance a litany of values, such as "rule of law," "fidelity to dem-
ocratically accountable legislators," and "good governance."32 Formed incremen-
tally in the shadow of such policy considerations, the canons can thus be under-
stood as "America's common law of statutory interpretation," comparable to, for
example, the common law of contracts, which has developed its own interpretive
regimes.
Taking seriously the view that canons are common law, it follows that Con-
gress can override them and create binding rules for how statutes should be in-
terpreted.34 Scholars advance this position in arguing for a set of federal rules of
statutory interpretation," and the view is reflected in the code books of states
that have enacted ambitious sets of legislated canons.36 If one accepts this view,
then legislated canons - such as the codifier's canon- ought to be controlling."
In fact, legislated canons should be accorded a type of authority denied common-
law canons (i.e., canons developed by courts). Namely, while the invocation of a
common-law canon typically requires weighing various potentially applicable
canons,3 8 a legislated canon- like any statutory provision- ought to be applied
whenever so required by its own terms.3 ' From this perspective, the Court's fail-
ure to abide by legislated canons - including ones that repudiate standard inter-
pretive methods - borders on lawlessness.
Alternatively, one might deny that Congress is free to dictate how courts
should interpret statutes. Pointing to Chief Justice Marshall's declaration that it
32. Id. at 20.
33. Id. at 21; see also Jacob Scott, Codified Canons and the Common Law of Interpretation, 98 GEO.
L.J. 341, 344 (2010) (describing canons as "nothing more than common law").
34. Cf Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990) (stating that a "statutory term" will not
be "given its common-law meaning, when that meaning is ... inconsistent with the statute's
purpose"). Much as Congress can override the common-law meaning of a term, it can over-
ride common-law methodologies of interpreting a provision.
35. See, e.g., Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Federal Rules of Statutory Interpretation, 115 HARV. L.
REV. 2085 (2002).
36. See Scott, supra note 33, at 411-31.
37. Cf Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of Separated Powers, 53 VAND.
L. REv. 1457, 1501-02 (2000) ("Congress makes the laws that the courts must apply, and it is
appropriate for Congress, as for any giver of binding instructions, to give instructions about
how those who must carry out the instructions should understand them." (footnote omit-
ted)).
38. See ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAw: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL
TEXTS 59 (2012) ("No canon of interpretation is absolute. Each may be overcome by the
strength of differing principles that point in other directions.").
39. One might also consider the heightened degree of democratic legitimacy underlying a con-
gressionally enacted legislated canon, as compared to a canon developed by the courts.
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is "the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is,"40
some have argued that Congress would violate the separation of powers if it were
to "attempt[] to control the interpretive process."4 1 According to this view, Con-
gress's job is to write the text of the statute, and the judiciary's task is to deter-
mine the statute's meaning. Congress may not change the boundaries of the text
of the statute by dictating what the courts can and cannot consider when deter-
mining meaning. A proponent of this view would take legislated canons to be
non-binding.
However, even this view does not mean that such an interpretive rule would
be irrelevant. Given that Congress enacted the rule, a legislated canon may signal
Congress's intent. A signal of intent is clearly relevant to the purposivist, who
applies the statute in light of its intended purpose. But it should be of interest to
the textualist as well. While the textualist generally eschews extrinsic sources of
legislative intent, no such prohibition applies to reading a statutory provision in
light of a related preamble or purpose clause, which, although not generating
substantive law, gives the interpreter insight into how Congress expected the
statute to apply.42 Like a preamble, the text of a legislated canon is enacted into
law by Congress and thus may be considered by courts. While the rule of inter-
pretation's directive may not override all contrary interpretive canons - as it
would for one who understood legislative canons to be binding -the interpreter
ought to accord it significant weight.
The following Parts demonstrate that, by including the codifier's canon in a
statute that enacts a title into positive law, Congress indicates that it does not
intend for changes in arrangement and captioning made by the OLRC, or its
predecessor institutions, during the positive law codification process to alter the
substantive meaning of the restated laws. This insight should guide courts in
determining how to interpret a statutory provision in light of an inclusion of the
40. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 177 (1803).
41. Linda D. Jellum, "Which Is To Be Master," the Judiciary or the Legislature? When Statutory Direc-
tives Violate Separation ofPowers, 56 UCLAL. REV. 837, 840 (2009); see also Larry Alexander &
Saikrishna Prakash, Mother May I? Imposing Mandatory Prospective Rules of Statutory Interpre-
tation, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 97, 99-100 (2003) ("Because the lodestar of statutory interpre-
tation is the discernment of the statute's meaning, binding rules of interpretation of whatever
sort must be ignored when an interpreter decides that the meaning of a statute differs from
the constructed 'meaning' derived from the application of binding rules of construction.").
42. See SCALIA & GARNER, supra note 38, at 217-20 (endorsing the canon that the preamble or
purpose clause may be given interpretive weight). Note that Justice Scalia joined the majority
opinion that featured one of the most remarkable uses of preambulatory text, Sutton v. United
Airlines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471 (1999). In that case, the Court determined that myopia is not a
disability within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act by noting that the stat-
ute's preamble only cited forty-three million people in the United States as having disabilities,
a number much smaller than if those with myopia were counted. Id. at 484-87
472
127-464 2017
UNCOVERING THE CODIFIER'S CANON
codifier's canon. Thus, although this Comment assumes that legislated canons
are binding, its key thesis should be of interest to interpreters -regardless of
their textualist-purposivist orientation-who are more skeptical of statutorily
enacted rules of construction. Even if legislated canons are not binding, they re-
flect the will of Congress, which courts should implement. As the next Part
shows, Congress has legislated about the interpretive weight to be accorded
placement and captions. Sound statutory interpretation means taking those leg-
islative choices seriously.
II. CAPTION AND PLACEMENT: THE CODIFIER'S CANON
As the previous Part argues, legislated canons should be treated as authori-
tative by the judiciary. The codifier's canon, however, has been largely ignored.
Rather than acknowledging Congress's directions regarding titles and captions,
courts have adhered to what is essentially a set of common-law canons. As Jacob
Scott has described, judges will turn to both titles and context when resolving
ambiguities.43 With regard to titles, the Court has long utilized this interpretive
tool, a fact made evident, for example, in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United
States, in which Justice Brewer made much of the criminal statute's title in order
to construe the text beyond what he conceded was its plain meaning.44 Noting
the relative ubiquity of the practice, Eskridge recently proposed referring to the
canon of interpreting a provision in light of its placement in the Code as noscitur
a legibus sociis ("it shall be known by its neighboring statutes").4 Citing the cap-
tions and placement of provisions within the Code may seem reasonable, but
like any common-law rule, the practice should give way to congressional legisla-
tion.4 6 The codifier's canon is such a legislated rule, and as such, the judiciary
ought to heed it.
A rough analysis reveals nearly identical statutory instructions on captions
and placement in at least thirteen positive law titles of the United States Code,
indicating that this phenomenon is not limited to any specific subset of laws.4 7
43. See Scott, supra note 33, at 363-64 (discussing state-level legislated canons in relation to the
process of codification).
44. 143 U.S. 457, 462 (1892). For another example of the Court's use of titles to discern statutory
meaning, see Almendarez-Torres v. United States, 523 U.S. 224, 234 (1998). See also 2A NORMAN
J. SINGER& SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION, § 47.3
(7 th ed. 2007) (explaining that while "[t]he title cannot control a statute's plain
words, ... [i] n case of ambiguity, the title may help resolve uncertainty" (footnote omitted)).
45. ESKRIDGE,supra note 14, at 118-20.
46. See Taylor v. United States, 495 U.S. 575, 594 (1990).
47. Cf sources cited supra note 5 (listing the occurrences of the codifier's canon). These occur-
rences of the codifier's canon were identified by searching for the canon's language in Westlaw.
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The codifier's canon in Title 18 is typical: "No inference of a legislative construc-
tion is to be drawn by reason of the chapter in Title 18 ... in which any particular
section is placed, nor by reason of the catchlines [captions] used in such title."48
Despite appearing at the beginning of the title, in Yates the rule went unno-
ticed; the Solicitor General's arguments, the opinion of the Court, and the con-
currence all ran afoul of this instruction, relying on both the caption of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1519 ("Destruction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investiga-
tions and bankruptcy") and its placement in the Code.4 9 Even Justice Kagan's
dissent, which is critical of the plurality's use of captions and placement, sanc-
tions the use of context and fails to reference the codifier's canon in Title 18.so
The Court's oversight was roundly criticized in the academic literature. Dorsey
admonished the Court for failing to heed Congress's instructions, alerting the
judiciary and the bar to these legislated canons' existence."
Dorsey's reading of the legislated rule as prohibiting all reference to the cap-
tions or the placement is reasonable. However, a more nuanced understanding
of the role of the OLRC offers a different lesson. The Justices did not rely on the
caption or the placement of § 1519; rather, they relied on Congress's choice of
caption and placement. As the next Part explains, the distinction between which
actor makes the structural or preambulatory choice is practically significant. Fur-
ther, it motivates a particular understanding of this statutory rule of construc-
tion.
Note that a few nonpositive law tides also include provisions that resemble the codifier's
canon. For example, 33 U.S.C. § 2751(c) says that no inference of legislative construction shall
be "drawn by reason of the caption or catchline of a provision enacted by this Act'" The Act in
question is the statute that enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990. As the text makes plain, this
provision is of limited scope, applying only to the captions created by that statute. While this
Comment does not consider these limited provisions, one might interpret the specificity of
the provision as suggesting, expressio unius, that in other cases captions can be legitimately
relied upon. This Comment discusses reliance on captions, infra text accompanying notes 74-
75. Note that this Comment does not consider a similar provision that appears in Title 26. See
supra note 9.
48. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 5 (2012)).
49. See Dorsey, supra note 8, at 387-89.
50. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1092 (2015) (Kagan, J., dissenting) ("I agree with the
plurality (really, who does not?) that context matters in interpreting statutes."). While Justice
Kagan does not reference the rule of construction, she does claim that utilizing captions and
placement is inconsistent with the Court's standard methodology. Id. at 1094 ("I know of no
other case in which we have begun our interpretation of a statute with the title, or relied on a
title to override the law's clear terms."); Id. at 1o95 ("As far as I can tell, this Court has never
once suggested that the section number assigned to a law bears upon its meaning."). Justice
Kagan's statement that the Court has never utilized a title to override a statute's "clear terms"
is most clearly countered in Church of the Holy Trinity v. United States, 143 U.S. 457,462 (1892).
51. Dorsey, supra note 8, at 386.
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III. WHOSE CHOICE IS IT, CONGRESS'S OR THE OFFICE OF THE LAW
REVISION COUNSEL'S?
To understand how the codifier's canon works, it is essential that one has a
picture of the codification process and the parties involved. When Congress has
chosen how a provision is to be codified, an interpreter can reasonably probe that
decision for evidence of intent; but Congress does not make every codification
decision. Instead, at times, the OLRC makes the critical choice. Created by stat-
ute in 1974, the OLRC has two primary functions. Its first function, classifica-
tion, is to examine each law that modifies a title that has not been enacted into
positive law and determine where in the title it should be placed.52 A positive law
title is itself a federal statute that constitutes legal evidence of the text of the law.
In contrast, a nonpositive law title is an editorial compilation of federal statutes
and serves only as prima facie evidence of the law. When choosing where to place
the provisions of a nonpositive law title, the attorneys in the OLRC generally
draw upon their own reading of the enacted text, without consulting congres-
sional staff." That a nonpositive law title is only prima facie evidence of the law
is a product of the fact that the attorneys in the OLRC are making editorial de-
cisions, which might, at least unintentionally, affect one's interpretation of the
provisions. Since the OLRC's choices regarding nonpositive law titles are re-
flected in the Code without having been voted on by Congress, one cannot legit-
imately draw any substantive inference about congressional intent from the cod-
ification decision. Adhering to this principle would be an instance of applying
what this Comment calls the generic codifier's canon, the interpretive rule that
one should distinguish the choices of Congress from those of the OLRC.
The second function, codification, is to prepare an initial draft of a bill to
restate existing law as a positive law title of the Code.54 This is an ongoing project
in which the OLRC goes through each title, preparing it to be enacted into pos-
itive law. By statute, as codified in 2 U.S.C. § 28 5b(1), the OLRC's compilation
is supposed to "remove ambiguities, contradictions, and other imperfections
both of substance and of form," while also leaving unchanged "the understood
policy, intent, and purpose of the Congress in the original enactments."" This is
52. 2 U.S.C. § 285 b( 4 ) (2012).
53. E-mail from Robert Sukol, Deputy Law Revision Counsel, Office of the Law Revision Coun-
sel (June 26, 2017) (on file with author).
54. 2 U.S.C. § 285 b(1) (2012).
ss. Id.
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an extremely difficult task, which presumes the ability to understand the original
intent behind the provisions in the first place. To assist in this process, the attor-
neys of the OLRC "actively seek[] input from Federal agencies, congressional
committees, and others with expertise in the area of the law being codified."5 6
There is no reason to believe the attorneys in the OLRC do not carry out the
office's duties in good faith, but their task is herculean. Even small changes to
the organization of a provision could have major repercussions, affecting, for ex-
ample, whether a timeliness requirement is found to be jurisdictional or wai-
vable." While communicating with members of agencies and Congress is clearly
helpful in this regard, there is no reason to believe that any of these actors will
perfectly know the "policy, intent, and purpose" of the Congress that originally
enacted the provision in question.
Given this reality, Congress, when enacting a title into positive law, has a
choice. On the one hand, it could enact the title as is, accepting the risk that the
new statute will unintentionally and substantively amend the previous law. On
the other hand, it could hedge by including rules of construction intended to
restrict the substantive effects of the positive law codification process. For the
most part, Congress has chosen the latter option. As traced in the next Part, Con-
gress has included the codifier's canon in numerous statutes that enacted titles
into positive law to prevent interpreters from mistakenly inferring a provision's
meaning from unintended artifacts of the codification efforts. Judges searching
for textual meaning or legislative intent would do well to account for that choice.
IV. THE FUNCTION OF THE CODIFIER'S CANON
A. Codification and the Risk of Inadvertent Change
Each statute's codifier's canon was enacted along with its respective positive
law title in order to prevent codifiers from inadvertently misleading interpreters
through reorganization. Consider, for example, the case of Title 28, enacted
into positive law in 1948.s' As the Court noted, the enactment into positive law
56. Positive Law Codification in the United States Code, OFF. L. REVISION COUNS. 3 (20o6),
http://uscode.house.gov/codification/positive law codification.pdf [http://perma.cc
/6KNC-W3 55].
57. See, e.g., Zipes v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U.S. 385, 393-94 (1982) (relying on the struc-
ture of 42 U.S.C. § 20ooe-5 (1970) in its determination that the timely-filing requirement is
non-jurisdictional).
58. Note that this Comment defines which canons are codifier's canons in part by the fact that
they are in positive law titles. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
59. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-773, § 33, 62 Stat. 869, 991 (codified at 28 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 5 (2012)).
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"was scarcely hasty, ill-considered legislation. To the contrary, it received close
and prolonged study."60 By this time, Congress had over half a century of expe-
rience attempting to codify law, generally using specially formed committees and
third parties, such as professors and publishers, to undertake the immense edi-
torial work that codification requires.6 1 These bodies, predecessors of the OLRC,
made significant revisions to the classification of the statutes, discarded the pre-
vious arrangements, introduced an outline based on subject matter, and pro-
vided labels.6 2 Among the most significant alterations was the classification of
provisions relating to issues of jurisdiction and procedure.63 Although this work
was useful, it necessarily involved interpretive decisions that are generally the
station of courts.
The codifier's canon in Title 28 prevented future courts from drawing infer-
ences of legislative intent from the organizational work that was the focus of the
codification process leading up to 1948. Sisk views this as an instance of Con-
gress having "lost its nerve," apparently judging the insertion of this rule of con-
struction as overly cautious.64 But Sisk fails to acknowledge Congress's prior his-
tory of openly struggling with mistakes introduced by the codification process.
Most dramatic might be the 1926 attempt at codification, which- as the legisla-
tive reference service of the Library of Congress revealed in a 1928 report-left
out several hundred provisions of permanent law.65 Such an incident is surely
enough to give one pause regarding even the most meticulous codification pro-
cesses. This concern is reflected in the congressional debates surrounding the
first set of codifications, which included Titles 18 and 28. In those debates, pro-
ponents of the codification bills repeatedly assured other representatives of the
6o. Exparte Collett, 337 U.S. 55, 65 (1949).
61. See Mary Whisner, The United States Code, Prima Facie Evidence, and Positive Law, 101 L. LIBR.
J. 545, 549-52 (2009).
62. H.R. REP. No. 80-308, at 5 (1947).
63. Revision of Titles 18 and 28 of the United States Code: Hearings on H.R. 16oo and H.R. 2o55Before
the Subcomm. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, Soth Cong. 44 (1947) (statement of John F.X.
Finn, former Special Counsel to the H. Comm. on Revision of the Laws) ("I am proudest of
the way this proposed code deals with jurisdiction, venue, removal of causes, full faith and
credit, and evidence and procedure. These are but labels to the layman. To the lawyer they are
the pitfalls of litigation.").
64. Sisk, supra note 12, at 462.
65. See Whisner, supra note 61, at 552. The list of the excluded provisions was reprinted in the
Congressional Record. See 69 CONG. REc. 4278-81 (1928).
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care taken to ensure that there were no substantive changes to the law other than
those explicitly reported to the Judiciary Committee (with those changes clearly
stated, rather than subtly introduced through the arrangement or captions) .66 It
is thus understandable that Congress included the codifier's canon not only in
Title 28, but also in Title 18 and many other titles when they were enacted into
positive law. 6 7 By directing courts not to draw inferences from the changes made
by the codifiers, Congress limited the risk of inadvertently introducing substan-
tive changes into the Code - a risk Congress had reason to believe was signifi-
cant.
But the circumstances are different once a title is enacted into positive law.
At that point, the title becomes a statute and only Congress can change it. For
that reason, every statute amending a positive title also includes specific instruc-
tions regarding its codification, directing where the amended provision should
be placed and how it should be captioned. 68 The editorial role of the OLRC re-
cedes into the background. The directions regarding placement and captions in
the Code are written into the statute by the legislative drafters, like any other
part of statutory language. The OLRC is absent from this process, except on the
occasion that someone in Congress informally calls upon an attorney from the
OLRC for advice.69
66. See, e.g., 93 CONG. REC. 5049 (1947) (statement of Rep. Walter) (explaining the care taken in
the codification process and suggesting that "the Committee on the Revision of the
Laws ... pointed out and explained every change in substantive law made by the bill"); see
also id. (statement of Rep. Cole) (seeking assurance that the bills "were simply codifications
of existing law and undertook to make no changes in existing law"). The debates also give
some hint as to why not every positive law title includes a version of the codifier's canon. At
the same time the codification of Titles 18 and 28 was being debated, the codification of Titles
1, 4, 6, 9, and 17 was also considered. In the process of reassuring the other representatives
that no substantive changes in the law would be made by the codification, one of Title 18 and
28's proponents distinguished between Titles 1, 4, 6, 9, and 17 and Titles 18 and 28. Specifi-
cally, he suggested that the former made "no change whatsoever in the law as it [was] written
on the books" at the time, compared to the codifications of Titles 18 and 28, which underwent
more substantial restructuring. 93 CONG. REc. 5029 (1947) (statement of Rep. Robinson). Of
those titles, only 18 and 28 include the codifier's canon, supporting the view that it was added
to respond specifically to the more involved changes made by the revisers.
67. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 5 (2012)). See supra note 5-
68. See, e.g., infra notes 102-lo8 and accompanying text (discussing 18 U.S.C. § 1519 (2012)). The
text of the statute enacting the provision specifies the language of the provision, the caption,
and where it should be placed. See Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802,
116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) ("Chapter 73
of title 18, United States Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: '§ 1519. De-
struction, alteration, or falsification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy."').
69. E-mail from Robert Sukol, Deputy Law Revision Counsel, Office of the Law Revision Coun-
sel (June 27, 2017) (on file with author).
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The distinction between codification decisions pre- and post-enactment into
positive law is a subtle one that has eluded courts. The Ninth Circuit, for in-
stance, failed to acknowledge this difference in Duncan v. Madigan, a case inter-
preting 18 U.S.C. § 5003.70 The panel explicitly rejected placement considera-
tions, explaining that " [a] s for § 5003, no act of Congress gave it that number.""
The court's caution about citing placement is understandable, but in Duncan, the
court got it wrong: the statute passed by Congress and enacted into law did spe-
cifically direct that the provision should be labeled § 5003 and added that it
should be placed "immediately after section 5oo2."72 The statute in question was
passed in 1952, after Title 18 was enacted into positive law. Thus, the placement
of the provision was not a mere post-passage editorial decision of the OLRC, but
rather a piece of the actual statute enacted by Congress."
From these facts about the codification process, one can derive a general rule:
For codification instructions in positive law titles, placement can be legitimately
invoked as reflecting congressional intent when they were passed after the en-
actment of the title into positive law. In contrast, placement in the Code that is
solely the product of the title's enactment into positive law cannot be as reliably
invoked. It is this distinction that Congress, interested in defending the intent
behind its legislative acts, sought to pass into law through the codifier's canon.
The situation is slightly more complicated for captions. Today, most statutes,
whether amending a positive law title or not, include captions.74 These are
simply adopted by the OLRC as it amends the Code. Older statutes, however,
were not as consistently captioned, and on occasion, amendments to a provision
make the original caption inappropriate.7 ' This makes the assignment of cap-
70. Duncan v. Madigan, 278 F.2d 695, 696 ( 9 th Cir. 1960) (per curiam).
71. Id.
72. Act of May 9, 1952, Pub. L. No. 82-333, 66 Stat. 68, 68.
73. On occasion, Congress does fail to specify where a provision should be placed despite the
provision clearly belonging in a positive law title. For a recent example, see sections 421, 431-
435, 501, 502, 508, 509, and 517 of the National Aeronautics and Space Administration Transi-
tion Authorization Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-10, 131 Stat. 18. While clearly belonging in Title
51, they were enacted as free-standing provisions. In such circumstances, the OLRC will pre-
pare a codification bill directing where the provisions ought to be codified. That codification
bill will then be enacted by Congress like any other. Such circumstances are the exceptions to
the rule that the OLRC is generally not involved in deciding the placement of provisions in
positive law titles. See E-mail from Sukol, supra note 69.
74. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, § 802,116 Stat. 745, 800 (codified
in scattered sections of 11, 15, 18, 28, and 29 U.S.C.) ("Chapter 73 of title 18, United States
Code, is amended by adding at the end the following: '§ 1519. Destruction, alteration, or fal-
sification of records in Federal investigations and bankruptcy."').
75. See E-mail from Sukol, supra note 53.
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tions, at least sometimes, part of the job of preparing a title for positive law cod-
ification. As with placement, the codifier's canon should be understood as pro-
hibiting interpreters from relying on captions imposed by the OLRC, without
preventing invocation of those captions added by Congress. As the next Section
elaborates, such a rule maintains the Court's standard practice of using captions,
but prevents the interpreter from mistakenly relying on the codifier's decisions
as indicia of legislative intent.
B. Constructing the Codifiers Canon
As the history of the codifier's canon indicates, its purpose is to prevent the
interpreter from mistakenly relying on the codifier's editorial decisions. To un-
derstand why such decisions ought not be relied upon, it is helpful to understand
how codification and interpretation interact for nonpositive law titles. A bill is
forwarded to the OLRC after it passes both chambers of Congress. 7 6 The attor-
neys in the office read each provision, determining where it will go in the Code.
For amendments to positive law titles, that project is relatively trivial, given that
the statutes themselves specify where the provisions are to be placed. For
nonpositive law titles, on the other hand, the process is more involved. Except in
the very rare case in which the statute itself directs where the provision should
be placed in the nonpositive law title of the Code, the decision is left to the
OLRC."
As already mentioned, the OLRC does not consult with Members of Con-
gress or other congressional staffwhen determining where the provisions should
go. While the attorneys in the office are experts in the Code, they do not gener-
ally have special insight into the minds of legislators. Thus, in addition to being
only prima facie evidence of the law, the placement of provisions in nonpositive
law titles can serve as only weak evidence of congressional intent. An interpreter
may only legitimately rely on the codifier's editorial decisions to the extent that
she believes that they reflect some insight into the statute's meaning gleaned
through the codifier's experience reading and classifying provisions in the Code.
In other words, the codifiers ought not to be accorded any more authority than
would be given an equally expert secondary source. But unlike the scholarly writ-
ings of an expert, an editorial change in the Code introduced by a codifier is not
76. The OLRC begins making these editorial determinations, referred to as "classifications,' after
the bill has been enrolled, but prior to presentment to the President. About Classification of
Laws to the United States Code, OFF. L. REVISION COUNS., http://uscode.house.gov/about
classification.xhtml [http://perma.cc/8S5E-8AHH].
77. See E-mail from Sukol, supra note 53.
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accompanied by a set of reasons accessible to the public. As a result, it is of lim-
ited interpretive value - even as a secondary source. Thus, an interpreter should
strive to avoid drawing inferences from changes made by the OLRC in a
nonpositive law title.
As previewed in the previous Section," captions or headings of provisions
are less predictable than placement in terms of whose choices they reflect. The
vast majority of statutory provisions, including in nonpositive law titles, are
given captions by the legislative drafter, which are part of the statute voted on by
Congress. On occasion, however, a statutory provision lacks a heading. When
that occurs in a nonpositive law title, the OLRC may decide to add a heading of
its own. While generally these are uncontroversial, there are exceptions. In
Mangum v. Action Collection Service, Inc., one of the litigants argued, and the dis-
trict court agreed, that the fact that the statute of limitations for the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act appears in a provision labeled "Jurisdiction" implies that
timeliness of an action is an element of subject matter jurisdiction, preventing
equitable tolling." On appeal, Judge Fernandez disagreed.so Noting that the
heading "Jurisdiction" was not in the statute itself, Judge Fernandez asserted that
"the mere fact that the Office of the Law Revision Counsel chose to create the
heading when it codified the provision does not affect our decision."" In support
of his decision not to consider the heading, Judge Fernandez explained that,
while "titles, in general, are of some help, . . . the mere addition of a title by the
Law Revision Counsel cannot change the meaning or intent of a statutory pro-
vision."8
The Statutes at Large prove Judge Fernandez correct. The label "Jurisdic-
tion" appears as marginalia without any direction within the body of the text as
to how the provision should be codified." This demonstrates that the OLRC
made the addition. Understanding how the OLRC works, the Ninth Circuit was
able to get closer to the correct understanding of congressional intent and statu-
tory meaning, while the lower court and other circuit courts were led astray.84
78. See supra text accompanying note 74.
79. No. CV-o 5 -50 7 -E-BLW, 2007 WE 1959076, at *2-3 (D. Idaho July 3, 2007), aff'd in part, rev'd
in part, 575 F.3 d 935 ( 9 th Cir. 2009).
80. Mangum v. Action Collection Serv., Inc., 575 F.3 d 935 ( 9 th Cir. 2009).
81. Id. at 939-40 (footnotes omitted).
82. Id.
83. See Act of Sept. 20,1977, Pub. L. No 95-lo9, § 813(d), 91 Stat. 874, 881.
84. The Eighth Circuit, for example, seemed to have missed this distinction in construing the
jurisdictional provisions of the Act. See Mattson v. U.S. W. Commc'ns, Inc., 967 F.2d 259, 262
(8th Cir. 1992).
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For interpreters, this presents an important lesson: by consulting the Statutes at
Large, one can ensure the legitimacy of an argument premised on a caption or
placement in the Code.
One might object that this makes too much of a minor point. As Abbe Gluck
and Lisa Schultz Bressman pointed out, the Senate or House Office of Legislative
Counsel drafts the text of statutes, not the legislators who actually vote." Thus,
while prepassage captions, for example, may have not been written by the
OLRC, they probably were not written by Members of Congress, either. But
there is a significant difference. Whereas the Offices of Legislative Counsel draft
legislation according to the direction of legislators and their staff before a bill is
voted upon, the OLRC- except in cases of preparing a title to be voted into pos-
itive law- makes its decisions after the bill has been passed. Since postpassage
decisions are not voted on by Congress, they do not constitute law. Nonpositive
law titles, then, are only prima facie evidence of the law, which can be trumped
by citation to the Statutes at Large - the language Congress actually consid-
ered.8 6 The latter are arranged according to legislators' instructions, even if
Members do not write them themselves, while the former are the product of the
OLRC.
In addition to that doctrinal difference, the nonlegislative codifiers differ
from the drafters in the degree to which they communicate with congressional
staffers. That difference matters if a statute's interpretation is to reflect Con-
gress's intent. When drafting statutes, there is close collaboration between the
Offices of Legislative Counsel and congressional staffers, who are directly ac-
countable to the elected officials enacting the law.8 7 While it is contested whether
such interactions are relevant to the statutory interpreter," it is reasonable to
85. Gluck & Bressman (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 740.
86. See 1 U.S.C. § 204(a) (2012); see also Stephan v. United States, 319 U.S. 423, 426 (1943) (per
curiam) (" [T]he Code establishes 'prima facie' the laws of the United States. But the very
meaning of 'prima facie' is that the Code cannot prevail over the Statutes at Large when the
two are inconsistent.").
87. See Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S. Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional
Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 575, 588-90 (2002) (discussing the collaboration between the
Office of Legislative Counsel and congressional staff when drafting legislation).
88. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Inside Congress's Mind, 115 CoLUM. L. REv. 1911 (2015) (arguing that
the Gluck-Bressman study reinforces the skepticism of legislative intent as a basis upon which
to interpret a statute).
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conclude that the collaboration between drafter and staff results in drafting de-
cisions that track the intentions of the enacting Congress. That collaborative re-
lationship is largely absent in the codification of nonpositive law. The OLRC
does not typically communicate with congressional staffers when determining
where to place a provision or what caption to add." Without the dialogue that
occurs during the drafting and enactment process, it would be misguided to infer
legislative intent from any decision made during codification.
These two distinguishing features work together to maintain the integrity of
the interpretive process. Since nonpositive law is only prima facie evidence, an
argument drawn from the organizational structure chosen by the OLRC without
consultation with Congress is less authoritative. In the case of positive law titles,
however, the organizational structure does become law. And while the OLRC
communicates with other actors when putting together a positive law title, it is
far from certain that decisions made about placement reflect the intent of the
enacting Congress, which may have passed the relevant provision decades be-
fore. Given that it is statutorily mandated that the positive law codification pro-
cess not change "the understood policy, intent, and purpose" of Congress,o it is
reasonable to seal off from consideration the editorial decisions of the OLRC.
The codifier's canon does just that.
To illustrate, consider a hypothetical version of Mangum v. Action Collection
Service, Inc." In this hypothetical, Title 15 is enacted into positive law sometime
before the case but after the enactment of 15 U.S.C. § 169 2k, which occurred in
1977. As discussed above, 92 after the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act was
passed, the OLRC added the caption "Jurisdiction" to § 1692k(d), the provision
specifying that an action to enforce a liability created by the statute must be
brought within a year.9' Since the caption was added by the OLRC to a nonposi-
tive law code, it has no legal authority. If, however, the OLRC were to propose
that Title 15 be enacted into positive law, it would likely submit to Congress a
89. E-mail from Sukol, supra note 53.
go. 2 U.S.C. § 28 5 b(1) (2012). Note that this statute's reference to "understood ... intent" sug-
gests that the enacting Congress expected that the judiciary would seek to enforce the inten-
tion behind a statute. The operative word, however, is "understood." One might argue that
the "understood" intent is Congress's understanding of how the provision would apply. Al-
ternatively, one could argue that it means that intent that would be inferred by a reasonable
person reading the provision. Either way, reading the codifier's canon in light of § 28 5b(1)
supports an interpretation that the canon was enacted, in each case, in order to prevent the
application of the statutory provision from changing as a result of codification.
91. 575 F.3d 935 (9 th Cir. 2009).
92. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
93. 15 U.S.C. § 16 9 2k(d) (2012).
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draft of the title based on the nonpositive law version. Thus, the caption "Juris-
diction" would appear in the proposed text. It is possible that a Member of Con-
gress or her staff, while reviewing the proposed text, would recognize this
change and its possible implications; but perhaps more likely, the change would
go unnoticed or unappreciated for its significance, and, eventually, it would be
enacted into law.
These two distinguishing features work together to maintain the integrity of
the interpretive process by ensuring that the editorial decisions of the OLRC are
not given legal effect. As a result, the court of appeals may have upheld the lower
court's holding and thrown out the case without considering the merits. That
would be a significant effect, counter to the likely intent of the legislators who
initially passed § 16 9 2k; and that effect would be due to the title having been
enacted into positive law. That is the consequence Congress sought to avoid by
including the codifier's canon in each of the thirteen positive law titles in which
it appears.
The text of the codifier's canon supports this tailored understanding of the
provision's command. The legislated canon in Title 18, for example, directs that
no inference should be made from the placement or caption "in Title 18 .. . as
set out in section 1 of this Act."94 Essentially identical language appears in each
instance of the codifier's canon.9 s Recall that these rules of construction were
enacted as part of the statutes that included the full text of the respective title of
the Code, as prepared by the OLRC or one of its predecessor institutions. The
text of the title appeared, in the case of Title 18, in section 1 of the enacting stat-
ute. Thus, by pointing to the title "as set out in section 1 of this Act," rather than
using the language "this Title," the legislated canon references only the version
of the title included in the Act itself. Reading the text literally and narrowly, the
prohibition on referencing placement and captions thus applies only to invoking
these features of the title as first enacted into positive law. The text makes no
reference to future statutes that amend the title by directing the OLRC to change
portions of the title as it appears in the Code. Those subsequent organizational
changes would come at the behest of Congress. The text of the codifier's canon
94. Act of June 25, 1948, Pub. L. No. 80-772, § 19, 62 Stat. 683, 862 (codified at 18 U.S.C. Front
Matter at 5 (2012)).
95. See sources cited supra note 5.
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tracks its purpose: to prevent interpreters from relying on organizational fea-
tures that do not reflect congressional intentions, without thwarting invocations
of organizational features that reflect deliberate congressional action.9 6
Not every positive law title, however, includes the codifier's canon, raising
the question of how much weight the interpreter should accord captioning and
placement decisions made during the positive law codification process in those
titles. Congress's failure to include the codifier's canon indicates greater confi-
dence that the codifier's organizational decisions have not modified the sub-
stance of the statutes. This might be, for example, because the title underwent
less intensive restructuring" or because Congress has developed more confi-
dence in the expertise of the OLRC in discerning its intent." Still, one should
proceed with caution, since the risk remains that the codifiers inadvertently
modified a provision's meaning. Even in the absence of the codifier's canon, an
interpreter should be careful not to place too much significance on a change in-
troduced by the OLRC. The generic codifier's canon, in other words, ought to be
applied, even if the legislated codifier's canon was not inserted into the title as it
was enacted.
Judicial practice has arrived at something like the generic codifier's canon. In
the past, the Court has warned against interpreting a change made in the context
of codification to have substantive significance absent "clearly expressed" in-
tent." One distinction is that in positive law titles in which the codifier's canon
96. Besides the textual and purposive arguments in favor of the interpretation presented here,
there is also an argument rooted in constitutional avoidance. Interpreting the codifier's canon
as preventing inferences from even Congress's choices of placement and caption in subsequent
legislation would threaten two distinct constitutional values. First, the expanded interpreta-
tion would have the effect of impairing Congress from effectively legislating by limiting the
means by which it can transmit its intent. This would potentially constitute an instance of one
Congress unconstitutionally attempting to restrict future Congresses' power to achieve legis-
lative ends. See Lockhart v. United States, 546 U.S. 142, 148 (2005) (Scalia, J., concurring).
Second, there is the presumption against congressional curtailment of the judiciary's powers:
a rule that suggests any legislated limitation on how the courts may engage in statutory inter-
pretation should be read narrowly. Cf, e.g., Chambers v. Nasco, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 43 (1991)
("It has long been understood that '[c]ertain implied powers must necessarily result to our
Courts ofjustice from the nature of their institution,' powers 'which cannot be dispensed with
in a Court, because they are necessary to the exercise of all others."' (quoting United States v.
Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812))).
97. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
gs. The fact that the codifier's canon has not been included in either of the most recently enacted
positive law titles suggests that this is the explanation. See Act of Dec. 18, 2010, Pub. L. No.
111-314, 124 Stat. 3328 (codified at 51 U.S.C.); Act of Dec. 19, 2014, Pub. L. No. 113-287, 128
Stat. 3094 (codified at 54 U.S.C.).
99. See Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U.S. 200, 209 (1993) ("[W]e do not presume that the
revision worked a change in the underlying substantive law 'unless an intent to make such [a]
chang[e] is clearly expressed."' (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prods. Corp., 353 U.S.
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appears as a legislated canon, its rule should apply unconditionally, whereas in
positive law titles in which it is not legislated, the rule should give way where
there is strong evidence that some substantive intent was carried out through the
change in captioning or arrangement. In practice, this would mean that in titles
in which the codifier's canon is legislated, any apparent substantive change im-
plied by placement or captions decisions during the positive law codification
process ought to be ignored unless there is a clear statement in the statute indi-
cating that the change is intended; in contrast, in positive law titles lacking the
legislated codifier's canon, other evidence, such as from statutory history, might
overcome the presumption against considering changes introduced through the
positive law codification process. But beyond this specific distinction, the general
principle embodied in the generic codifier's canon applies to every title, both
positive and nonpositive: judges, when referencing placement or captions,
should strive to understand whether the interpretive evidence they cite can in
fact be attributed to the Congress that enacted the relevant provision.100
V. YATES AS A CASE STUDY: CONGRESSIONAL INTENT THROUGH
CAPTION AND PLACEMENT
The codifier's canon (in both its generic and legislated variety) should be
read in conjunction with 2 U.S.C. § 285b, the provision dictating that the OLRC
may not make changes to the law's "understood policy, intent, and purpose."o
No such limitation applies to Congress. When Congress passes most new legis-
lation, in contrast to enacting positive law titles, its intention is generally to gen-
erate new substantive law. As a result, it is sensible to turn to Congress's delib-
erate decisions about organization when reconstructing intent. This point is
made clear by 18 U.S.C. § 1519, the provision at the center of Yates. The bill that
the Senate considered and ultimately enacted into law specified both where in
the Code it should be placed and the caption.102 These choices were not mere
222, 227 (1957))); Anderson v. Pac. Coast S.S. Co., 225 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1912) ("[I]t will not
be inferred that Congress, in revising and consolidating the laws, intended to change their
effect unless such intention is clearly expressed.").
ioo. Note that this rule applies equally to textualists and purposivists. It proposes that interpreters
compare the statute as it appears post-positive law codification with how it was first enacted.
This requires utilizing statutory history (as opposed to legislative history), which textualists
have historically considered a legitimate interpretive source. See Tobias A. Dorsey, Some Re-
flections on Not Reading the Statutes, 10 GREEN BAG 2D 283, 290 (2007) (discussing the tradi-
tional usage of statutory history).
io0. Recall that concern over inadvertent substantive changes to the law was the focal point of
congressional debates over codification. See supra note 66 and accompanying text.
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afterthoughts. In an amicus brief filed in Yates, Representative Oxley, one of the
sponsors of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) of which § 1519 was a part, pointed
to parts of the Act's legislative history to show that the relationship between
§ 1519 and the section of the Code beside which it would appear featured prom-
inently in the legislators' motivations for enactment. 10
Representative Oxley cited the legislative history, including the report of the
Senate Judiciary Committee,104 which explicitly stated that § 1519 was created to
fill gaps in the criminal statutes caused by courts' narrow reading of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1512. o The Judiciary Committee's report specifically referred to the provision
by its Code section designation and even cited its relationship to the rest of Title
18 as the reason why it should not be "interpreted more broadly than we in-
tend."106 In other words, the report spoke to a congressional expectation that in-
terpreters would consider § 1519's placement. SOX's legislative history makes
clear the congressional intent that is less obvious, though no less real, in other
statutes that contain codification instructions: Congress occasionally vests titles,
captions, and headings with interpretive significance. The text of legislated cod-
ifier's canon ought not to be understood as forbidding the courts from giving
weight to these explicit and deliberate legislative decisions.
The plurality opinion in Yates applies the tailored interpretation of the codi-
fier's canon this Comment has defended. Writing for the Court, Justice Ginsburg
does not merely point to where the section appears; rather, she specifically ad-
dresses Congress's decision about how to "direct codification of the Sarbanes-Ox-
ley Act."O7 By discussing where "Congress directed placement" of the provisions,
Justice Ginsburg grounds her inference in Congress's statutory instructions to
the codifiers and not the Code itself.0"
103. See Brief for the Honorable Michael Oxley as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner at 9-11,
Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074 (2015) (No. 13-7451) ("It is therefore no accident or
happenstance that Section 1519 was paired with Section 1520, and that placement elucidates
the scope of the 'tangible object[s]' within the scope of Section 1519. Reading the two provi-
sions together makes clear that Congress's focus was the destruction of 'records, a point rein-
forced by that word's usage in the title to SOX Section 802 and the titles of both Section 1519
and 1520.").
104. Id. at 12.
105. S. REP. No. 107-146, at 6-7 (2002).
1o6. Id. at 27. These statements in the committee report are suggestive of congressional intent,
since, as Gluck and Bressman have described, such reports are generally written by staff with
significant policy expertise and a high degree of direct accountability to their respective Mem-
bers of Congress. Gluck & Bressman (pt. 2), supra note 23, at 741.
107. Yates v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1074, 1084 (2015) (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
io8. Id. Whether Justice Ginsburg consciously drew this distinction is not evident from the opin-
ion. In fact, in other portions, she refers merely to " [s]ection 1519's position" within the title -
a statement that does not reflect the distinction this Comment contends is crucial. Id. at 1083.
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This is the proper line to draw, foreclosing the influence of nonelected codi-
fiers without discarding Congress's own deliberate choices about codification.
The distinction is not merely rhetorical. Congress's enactment of the interpretive
instruction means that it is not enough to look at the Code; courts and practi-
tioners must be able to point to the relevant text in the Statutes at Large before
drawing inferences from a provision's caption or placement in the Code.
Noting that one may utilize a provision's placement or caption does not end
the inquiry. Parties can disagree about the significance of a provision's placement
or caption - a point reflected in the debate between the plurality and dissent in
Yates - even if they agree that those choices matter in some way. As Justice Kagan
argues, one should be cautious in citing a provision's caption, which is, "almost
necessarily, an abridgment," not describing the full scope of the provision's ap-
plication.' Similarly, two parties might reasonably disagree about what a pro-
vision's placement in the Code indicates about the meaning of the text.11 0 Ulti-
mately, a persuasive argument utilizing the organizational features of the Code
is one that integrates those particular features into a larger narrative offering "a
fair understanding of the legislative plan" underlying the statute's enactment.
To do so effectively requires an appreciation for how those organizational fea-
tures were generated in the first place. In other words, statutory interpretation
must be informed by the codification process. That is the crucial principle of the
codifier's canon.
CONCLUSION
The realities of the codification process must inform statutory interpretation.
The codifier's canon is therefore best understood within the context of how the
Code is prepared. Enacted along with its respective positive law title, each in-
stance of the codifier's canon directs courts not to draw inferences from the or-
ganizational decisions made by the OLRC or its predecessors during codifica-
tion. It does not, however, prevent courts from drawing conclusions about
legislative intent based on Congress's choice of caption and placement. As a gen-
eral rule, this means that interpreters should consult the Statutes at Large before
iog. Id. at 1094 (Kagan, J., dissenting).
11o. Compare id. at 1095 (arguing that because the placement of § 1519 did not "logically fit into
any of [Chapter 73's] pre-existing sections" and "with the first 18 numbers of the chapter
already taken ... the law naturally took the 1 9 th place," i.e., § 1519), with id. at 1077 (plurality
opinion) ("Section 1519's position within Title 18, Chapter 73, further signals that § 1519 was
not intended to serve as a cross-the-board ban on the destruction of physical evidence. Con-
gress placed § 1519 at the end of Chapter 73 following immediately after pre-existing special-
ized provisions expressly aimed at corporate fraud and financial audits.").
iii. Kingv. Burwell, 135 S. Ct. 2480, 2496 (2015).
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making arguments based on captions or placement in the Code. As a rule of
thumb, however, it is legitimate to cite the placement of a provision in a positive
law title so long as the provision was enacted after the title itself was passed into
positive law. This rule should at least be considered-if not strictly followed-
even when interpreting provisions in positive law titles that lack the codifier's
canon. More generally, courts should adhere to the generic codifier's canon when-
ever interpreting provisions in the Code, being careful to distinguish the deci-
sions of Congress from those of the OLRC. Adhering to these rules adds pre-
dictability and legitimacy to statutory interpretation, while also engendering
respect for the interbranch communication exemplified by enactments of the
codifier's canon.
DANIEL B. LISTWA*
Yale Law School, J.D. expected. I would like to thank Professor Bill Eskridge for his inspira-
tion, encouragement, and feedback on early drafts; Rob Sukol and Toby Dorsey for their help-
ful insights and crucial edits; Sarah Kellner for her patience and support; and the editors of
the Yale Law Journal, especially Max Siegel, for their thoughtful assistance in developing and






THE YALE LAW JOURNAL
JANUARY 2018
VOLUME 127, NUMBER 3
Yale Law School
New Haven, Connecticut
RESPONSEs. The Yale Law Journal invites short papers responding to scholarship
appearing in the Journal within the last year. Responses should be submitted to
the Yale Law Journal Forum at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/submissions. We
cannot guarantee that submitted responses will be published. Responses selected for
publication will be edited with the cooperation of the author.
The Yale Law Journal is published eight times a year (monthly from October through June, with the
exception of December) by The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. Editorial and general offices are
located in the Sterling Law Building at Yale University. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to
Yale Law Journal, P.O. Box 208215, New Haven, Connecticut o6520-8215.
SUBSCRIPTIONs. A year subscription for Volume 127 is $55.oo payable in advance (please see
our website for overseas shipping charges). Remittance must be made by U.S. dollar drafts payable
at a U.S. bank. Unfortunately, we are not able to accept payments in cash or by credit
card. Subscription requests received after the first issue of a volume has been printed will
run for eight consecutive issues unless otherwise indicated by the subscriber. Subscription
backstarting is not permitted to include prior volume years. Overseas delivery is not guaranteed.
CLAIMs. Domestic claims for non-receipt of issues should be made within 90 days of the month
ofpublication, and overseas claims within 18o days. Thereafter, the regular back issue rate will
be charged for replacement. All subscriptions will be renewed automatically unless the
subscriber provides timely notice of cancellation prior to the start of a new volume year. Address
changes must be made at least two months before publication date. Please provide an old mailing label
or the entire old address; the new address must include the ZIP code. Address changes or
other requests for subscription information should be directed to the Business Administrator.
SINGLE AND BACK ISSUEs. Each issue of of the Journal can be purchased prepaid from The Yale Law
Journal Company, Inc., for $25 (check must accompany order). For Connecticut deliveries, add
6% state sales tax. Remittance must be made by U.S. dollar drafts payable to a U.S. bank.
Unfortunately, we are not able to accept payments in cash or credit card. To purchase back issues
from Volumes 1-126, please contact William S. Hein & Company, Inc., 1285 Main
Street, Buffalo, New York 14209, (800) 828-7571. Back issues can also be found in electronic
format on HeinOnline (http://heinonline.org) and through Volume 110 on the Yale
Law Journal's website (http://www.yalelawjournal.org).
MANUSCRIPTs. The Journal invites the submission of unsolicited Articles, Essays BookReviews, and
Forum pieces. Manuscripts must be submitted online at http://www.yalelawjournal.org/submissions.
COPYRIGHT. Copyright © 2018 by The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. Requests for
copyright permissions should be directed to CopyrightClearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers,
MA 01923, (978) 750-8400, http://www.copyright.com.
PRODUCTION. Citations in the Journal conform to The Bluebook: A Uniform System of Citation (20th ed.
2015), copyright by The Columbia Law Review Association, The Harvard Law Review Association, the
University of Pennsylvania Law Review, and The Yale Law Journal Company, Inc. The Journal
is printed by Sheridan in Hanover, Pennsylvania. Periodicals postage paid at New Haven,
Connecticut, and additional mailing offices. Publication number ISSN 0044-0094.
INTERNET ADDREss. The Yale Law Journal's homepage is http://www.yalelawjournal.org.
YALE LAW SCHOOL
OFFICERS OF ADMINISTRATION
Peter Salovey, A.B., MA., Ph.D., President of the University
Benjamin Polak, BA., M.A., Ph.D., Provost of the University
Heather K. Gerken, A.B., J.D., Dean
Alvin K. Klevorick, B.A., M.A., Ph.D., Deputy Dean
Muneer I. Ahmad, A.B., J.D., Deputy Dean for Experiential Education
Oona A. Hathaway, A.B., J.D., Counselor to the Dean
Michael J. Wishnie, BA., J.D., Counselor to the Dean
Sharon C. Brooks, B.A., J.D., Special Advisor for Strategic Engagement
Ellen M. Cosgrove, BA., J.D., AssociateDean
Joseph M. Crosby, B.A., M.BA., Associate Dean
Toni Hahn Davis, BA, M.S.W., J.D., LL.M., Associate Dean
Mary Matheron, B.S., AssociateDean
Teresa Miguel-Stearns, B.A., MA., J.D., Law Librarian
Mike K. Thompson, BA, M.B.A., J.D., Associate Dean
FACULTY EMERITI
Guido Calabresi, LL.B., Dr.Jur., LL.D., D.Phil., H.Litt.D., D.Poli.Sci., SterlingProfessor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial
LecturerinLaw
Dennis E. Curtis, B.S., LL.B., Clinical ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Harlon Leigh Dalton, B.A., J.D., Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Mirjan Radovan Damaika, LL.B., Dr.Jur., SterlingProfessor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Drew S. Days, III, BA., LL.B., Alfred M. Rankin Professor Emeritus of Law and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Robert C. Ellickson, A.B., LL.B., Walter E. Meyer Professor Emeritus ofProperty and Urban Law and Professorial Lecturer
in Law
Owen M. Fiss, BA, B.Phil., LL.B., SterlingProfessor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
RobertW. Gordon, A.B., J.D., ChancellorKent ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and Legal History
Michael J. Graetz, B.BA., LL.B.,Justus S. HotchkissProfessor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
S. Blair Kauffman, B.A., B.S., J.D., LL.M., M.L.L., Law Librarian Emeritus
John H. Langbein, LL.B., Ph.D., Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Legal History and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Jerry L. Mashaw, LL.B., Ph.D., Sterling Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Carol M. Rose, BA, MA, Ph.D., J.D., Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Organization and Professorial
Lecturer in Law
Peter H. Schuck, BA., J.D., LL.M., MA., Simeon E. Baldwin ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw
John G. Simon, LL.B., LL.D., Augustus E. Lines Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Robert A. Solomon, BA., J.D., Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw
StephenWizner, A.B., J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw and ProfessorialLecturer in Law
FACULTY
t Bruce Ackerman, BA., LL.B., Sterling Professor ofLaw and Political Science
Muneer I. Ahmad, A.B., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw
t Anne L. Alstott, A.B., J.D., Jacquin D. Bierman Professor in Taxation
Akhil ReedAmar, BA., J.D., SterlingProfessor ofLaw
Rick Antle, B.S., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
Ian Ayres, BA, J.D., Ph.D., William K. Townsend Professor ofLaw
Miriam Baer, A.B., J.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Jack M. Balkin, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Knight Professor of Constitutional Law and the FirstAmendment
Aharon Barak, LL.M., Dr.Jur., VisitingProfessor ofLaw and Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow (fall term)
t Monica C. Bell, BA., M.Sc., J.D., A.M., Associate Professor of Law
Seyla Benhabib, B.A., B.A., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Philip C. Bobbitt, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Visiting Professor of Law (fall term)
Lea Brilmayer, BA, J.D., LL.M., Howard M. Holtzmann Professor ofInternational Law
Guido Calabresi, LL.B., Dr.Jur., LL.D., D.Phil., H.Litt.D., D.Poli.Sci., SterlingProfessor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial
LecturerinLaw
Steven G. Calabresi, B.A., J.D., VisitingProfessor ofLaw (fall term)
Alejandro Camacho, BA., J.D., LL.M., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor of Law (fall term)
StephenL. Carter, B.A., J.D., William Nelson Cromwell Professor ofLaw
Marian Chertow, B.A., M.P.P.M., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
t Amy Chua, A.B., J.D., John M. Duff, Jr. Professor of Law
Dennis E. Curtis, B.S., LL.B., Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Anne C. Dailey, B.A., J.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Harlon L. Dalton, BA., J.D., Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Mirjan Radovan Damaika, LL.B., Dr.Jur., SterlingProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and ProfessorialLecturer inLaw
Drew S. Days, III, B.A., LL.B.,Alfred M. Rankin Professor Emeritus ofLaw and ProfessorialLecturerin Law
Aaron A. Dhir, B.A., LL.B., LL.M., Visiting Professor ofLaw and Oscar M. Ruebhausen Distinguished Senior Fellow
Fiona Doherty, B.A., J.D., Clinical Associate Professor ofLaw
Steven B. Duke, B.S., J.D., LL.M., Professor ofLaw
Robert C. Ellickson, A.B., LL.B., WalterE. MeyerProfessor Emeritus of Property and Urban Law and Professorial Lecturer in
Law
E. DonaldElliott, B.A., J.D., Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw
WilliamEskridge, Jr., B.A., M.A., J.D., JohnA. GarverProfessor offurisprudence
Daniel C. Esty, A.B., M.A., J.D., Hillhouse Professor of Environmental Law and Policy, School of Forestry &
Environmental Studies; and Clinical Professor ofEnvironmental Law and Policy, Law School
Joan Feigenbaum, A.B., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law
Russell Feingold, B.A., B.A., M.A., J.D., Martin R. Flug Visiting Professor in the Practice ofLaw
Owen M. Fiss, BA., B.Phil, LL.B., Sterling Professor Emeritus of Law and Professional Lecturer in Law
James Forman, Jr., A.B., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Heather K. Gerken, B.A., J.D., Dean and Sol & Lillian Goldman Professor ofLaw
Paul Gewirtz, BA., J.D., Potter Stewart Professor of Constitutional Law
Ronald J. Gilson, A.B., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (fall term)
Abbe R. Gluck, B.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Miriam Gohara, B.A., J.D., Clinical Associate Professor ofLaw
Gregg Gonsalves, B.S., Ph.D., Associate Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
RobertW. Gordon, A.B., J.D., Chancellor Kent ProfessorEmeritus ofLaw and Legal History
Gary B. Gorton, BA., MA., MA., M.A., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Michael J. Graetz, B.B.A., LL.B.,Justus S. Hotchkiss Professor Emeritus of Law and Professorial Lecturer in Law (fall term)
David Singh Grewal, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw
Dieter F. Grimm, LL.M., Dr.Jur., Visiting Professor of Law and Gruber Global Constitutionalism Fellow (fall term)
Henry B. Hansmann, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., OscarM. Ruebhausen Professor ofLaw
Robert D. Harrison, BA., J.D., Ph.D., Lecturer in Legal Method
Oona A. Hathaway, BA., J.D., Gerard C. and Bernice Latrobe SmithProfessor ofinternational Law and Counselor to the Dean
Christine Jolls, BA, J.D., Ph.D., Gordon Bradford TweedyProfessor ofLaw and Organization
Dan M. Kahan, B.A., J.D., Elizabeth K. Dollard Professor ofLaw and Professor of Psychology
Paul W. Kahn, BA, J.D., Ph.D., Robert W. Winner Professor ofLaw and the Humanities
Amy Kapczynski, A.B., M.Phil., M.A., J.D., Professor ofLaw
S. Blair Kauffman, BA, B.S., J.D., LL.M., M.L.L., Law Librarian Emeritus
Aaron Kesselheim, A.B., M.D., J.D., M.P.H., Irving S. Ribicoff VisitingAssociate Professor of Law (fall term)
Alvin K. Klevorick, BA, M.A., Ph.D., Deputy Dean, John Thomas Smith Professor ofLaw, and Professor ofEconomics
Joshua Knobe, B.A., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Harold Hongju Koh, AB., BA, MA., J.D., SterlingProfessor ofInternationalLaw
Issa Kohler-Hausmann, B.A., M.A., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor ofLaw and Associate Professor of Sociology
t Anthony T. Kronman, BA, J.D., Ph.D., SterlingProfessor ofLaw
* Douglas Kysar, B.A., J.D., Joseph M. Field '55 Professor ofLaw
Marianne Engelman Lado, BA., MA., J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Clinical Professor of Law (fall term)
John H. Langbein, LL.B., Ph.D., Sterling Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Legal History and Professorial Lecturer in Law
Anika Singh Lemar, B.A., J.D., ClinicalAssociate Professor ofLaw
Daryl Levinson, A.B., MA., J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
* Zachary Liscow, B.A., Ph.D. J.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
Yair Listokin, AB., MA, Ph.D., J.D., ShibleyFamily Fund Professor ofLaw
Jonathan R. Macey, A.B., J.D., Sam Harris Professor of Corporate Law, Corporate Finance, and Securities Law
Daniel Markovits, BA, M.Sc., D.Phil., J.D., Guido Calabresi Professor ofLaw
Jerry L. Mashaw, BA, LL.B., Ph.D., Sterling Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
* Tracey L. Meares, B.S., J.D., Walton Hale Hamilton Professor ofLaw
A. Douglas Melamed, B.A., J.D., Florence Rogatz Visiting Professor in the Practice of Law (fall term)
Noah Messing, B.A., J.D., Lecturer in the Practice ofLaw and Legal Writing
Andrew Metrick, B.A., MA., A.M., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Teresa Miguel-Stearns, B.A., J.D., MA., Law Librarian and Professor ofLaw
Alice M. Miller, A.B., J.D., Associate Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw
John D. Morley, B.S., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Samuel Moyn, A.B., J.D., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw and Professor ofHistory
Christina M. Mulligan, A.B., J.D., Irving S. Ribicoff Visiting Associate Professor of Law (spring term)
t Douglas G. NeJaime, A.B., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Marisol Orihuela, B.A., J.D., Clinical Professor ofLaw
Nicholas R. Parrillo, AB., MA, J.D., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw
t Jean Koh Peters, A.B., J.D., Sol Goldman Clinical Professor ofLaw
Richard Pildes, A.B., J.D., Maurice R Greenberg Visiting Professor of Law (spring term)
Robert C. Post, AB., J.D., Ph.D., Sterling Professor of Law
J.L. Pottenger, Jr., A.B., J.D., Nathan Baker ClinicalProfessor ofLaw
Claire Priest, BA, J.D., Ph.D., SimeonE. Baldwin Professor ofLaw
* George L. Priest, B.A., J.D., Edward J. Phelps Professor of Law and Economics and Kauffman Distinguished Research
ScholarinLaw, Economics, and Entrepreneurship
* W. Michael Reisman, LL.M., J.S.D., Myres S. McDougal Professor ofInternationalLaw
Judith Resnik, B.A., J.D., ArthurLiman Professor ofLaw
Cristina Rodriguez, M.Litt., J.D., Leighton Homer Surbeck Professor of Law
Daria Roithmayr, B.S., J.D., Martin R. Flug Visiting Professor ofLaw and Peter and Patricia Gruber Fellow in Global
justice
Roberta Romano, M.A., J.D., SterlingProfessor ofLaw
Carol M. Rose, M.A., Ph.D., J.D., Gordon Bradford Tweedy Professor Emeritus of Law and Organization and Professorial
Lecturer in Law (fall term)
* Susan Rose-Ackerman, BA., Ph.D., Henry R. Luce Professor ofJurisprudence, Law School and Department of Political
Science
Rachel E. Rosenbloom, M.A., J.D., Visiting Professor of Law (fall term)
* Jed Rubenfeld, A.B., J.D., Robert R Slaughter Professor ofLaw
Wojciech Sadurski, LL.M., Ph.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Calixto Salomao Filho, LL.B., Ph.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw
David N. Schleicher, A.B., M.Sc., J.D., Professor ofLaw
Peter H. Schuck, BA., J.D., LL.M., MA., SimeonE. Baldwin Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Vicki Schultz, BA., J.D., Ford Foundation Professor ofLaw and Social Sciences
* Alan Schwartz, B.S., LL.B., SterlingProfessor ofLaw
Fiona M. Scott Morton, BA., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Ian Shapiro, B.Sc., M.Phil., J.D., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Scott J. Shapiro, BA, J.D., Ph.D., Charles F. Southmayd Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPhilosophy
* Reva Siegel, BA, M.Phil., J.D., Nicholas deB. Katzenbach Professor ofLaw
James J. Silk, AB., M.A., J.D., Binger Clinical Professor ofHuman Rights
John G. Simon, A.B., LL.B., Augustus E. Lines Professor Emeritus ofLaw
Lawrence M. Solan, B.A., Ph.D., J.D., Sidley Austin-Robert D. McLean Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Kate Stith, A.B., J.D., M.P.P., Lafayette S. Foster Professor ofLaw
Heather E. Tookes, A.B., Ph.D., Professor (Adjunct) of Law (fall term)
Tom R. Tyler, BA, MA., Ph.D., Macklin Fleming Professor ofLaw and Professor ofPsychology
Robert R.M. Verchick, A.B., J.D., Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
PatrickWeil, B.A., M.BA., Ph.D., Martin R. FlugVisitingProfessor ofLaw (fall term) and SeniorResearchScholarinLaw
(spring e-n)
James Q. Whitman, BA, MA, Ph.D., J.D., Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law
Steven Wilf, B.S., MA., M.Phil., Ph.D., J.D., Maurice R Greenberg Visiting Professor ofLaw (spring term)
Michael J. Wishnie, B.A., J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor of Law and Counselor to the Dean
John FabianWitt, BA, J.D., Ph.D., Allen H. Duffy Class of 1960 Professor of Law
StephenWizner, A.B., J.D., William 0. Douglas Clinical Professor Emeritus ofLaw and Professorial Lecturer in Law
GideonYaffe, A.B., Ph.D., Professor ofLaw, Professor ofPhilosophy, and Professor ofPsychology
Taisu Zhang, BA., J.D., Ph.D., Associate Professor ofLaw
HowardV. Zonana, B.A., M.D., Clinical Professor (Adjunct) ofLaw (spring term)
On leave ofabsence, 2017-20 18.
On leave of absence, fall term, 2017.
On leave of absence, spring term, 2018.
LECTURERS IN LAW
Logan Beirne, B.S., J.D.
Kristen Bell, BA., J.D., Ph.D.
Alisha Bjerregaard, A.B.., J.D.
Hannah Block-Wehba, B.A., J.D.
Rebecca Crootof, BA., J.D., Ph.D.
Jason Eiseman, B.A., M.L.S.
Tamar Ezer, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Laura Fernandez, A.B., LL.M., J.D.
Joshua U. Galperin, BA., J.D., M.E.M.
Shelley Geballe, BA., J.D., M.P.H.
Lisa A. Goodman, BA., B.S., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Linda Greenhouse, B.A., M.S.L., Joseph Goldstein Lecturer in Law
Claudia Haupt, LL.B., Ph.D., LL.M., J.S.D.
Jordan A. Jefferson, B.S., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Cortelyou Kenney, A.B., J.D.
Julie Graves Krishnaswami, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Christine Kwon, BA., J.D.
John Langford, B.A., B.M, J.D.
Stephen Latham, A.B., J.D., Ph.D.
Ruben Loyo, B.A., J.D.
Evelyn L. Ma, B.A., M.L.S., J.D.
NadiaMarzouki,BA., MA.,Ph.D.
Scott Matheson, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S., M.PA.
Hope R. Metcalf, BA., J.D.
John B. Nann, B.A., M.S.L.S., J.D.
Lucie Olejnikova, B.S., M.L.S., J.D.
Victor R. Rodriguez, B.A., J.D.
Eugene Russyn, B.A., J.D.
David A. Schulz, B.A., M.A., J.D., Floyd Abrams Clinical Lecturer in Law
Fred R. Shapiro, S.B., M.S.L.S., J.D.
Priscilla Smith, B.A., J.D.
Stacia Stein, B.A., J.D., M.L.I.S.
Anna VanCleave, BA., M.A., J.D.
Michael VanderHeijden, BA., J.D., M.L.S.
Aaron P. Wenzloff, B.B.A., J.D.
Michael Widener, B.J., M.L.I.S.
VISITING LECTURERS IN LAW
Elizabeth K. Acee, B.S., J.D.
Mark Barnes, BA., J.D., LL.M.
Sandra S. Baron, BA., J.D.
Kelly M. Barrett, B.A., J.D.
Craig Becker, BA., J.D.
James Bhandary-Alexander, BA., J.D.
Susan Biniaz, B.A., J.D.
Diana Blank, BA., M.A., Ph.D., J.D.
Stephen B. Bright, B.A., J.D., Harvey Karp Visiting Lecturer in Law
Craig B. Brod, B.A., J.D.
Sanford 0. Bruce III, B.A., J.D.
John J. Buckley, Jr., A.B., J.D.
Robert Chatigny, A.B., J.D.
Heather L. Coleman, BA., J.D.
Kevin Cremin, B.A., J.D.
Victoria A. Cundiff, B.A., J.D.
Benjamin M. Daniels, B.A., M.S., J.D.
Tadhg Dooley, BA., J.D.
W. Neil Eggleston, B.A., J.D.
Amy Eppler-Epstein, B.A., J.D.
Eugene R. Fidell, BA., LL.B., Florence Rogatz Visiting Lecturer in Law
Lara Finkbeiner, BA., M.S., J.D.
Adam Fleisher, A.B., J.D.
Lawrence J. Fox, B.A., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Constance Frontis, B.A., J.D.
William Garfinkel, B.A., J.D.
Jeffrey Gentes, B.A., J.D.
Frederick S. Gold, B.A., J.D.
Daniel Goldberg, B.A., J.D.
David Harfst, BA., J.D.
David G. Hawkins, BA., J.D.
Rebecca M. Heller, A.B., J.D.
Paul W. Hughes, A.B., M.A., J.D.
Michael Kimberly, A.B., M.A., J.D.
Katherine M. Kimpel, B.A., J.D.
Alex A. Knopp, BA., J.D.
Katherine L. Kraschel, B.A., J.D.
Jonathan Landy, A.B., J.D.
Jonathan Lovvorn, B.A., J.D., LL.M.
Colman Lynch, BA., J.D.
C.J. Mahoney, A.B., J.D.
Amy Marx, BA., MA., M.S., J.D.
Michelle N. Mendez, BA., J.D.
Ellen Messali, B.A., J.D.
Jeffrey A. Meyer, B.A., J.D.
Joseph P. Moodhe, B.A., J.D.
Cantwell F. Muckenfuss III, B.A., J.D.
SaralaV. Nagala, BA., J.D.
Charles M. Nathan, B.A., J.D.
David B. Noland, A.B., J.D.
Ann M. Parrent, BA., J.D.
Avi Perry, B.A., J.D.
Andrew J. Pincus, B.A., J.D.
Stephen T. Poellot, B.A., J.D.
Eric S. Robinson, A.B., M.BA., J.D.
David N. Rosen, A.B., LL.B.
Charles A. Rothfeld, A.B., J.D.
John M. Samuels, B.A., J.D., LL.M, George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Sia M. Sanneh, BA., MA., J.D.
Ellen Scalettar, B.A., J.D.
Kevin S. Schwartz, A.B., M.BA., Ph.D., J.D.
Erin R. Shaffer, B.A., J.D.
Phil Spector, BA., J.D.
Lisa Suatoni, B.A., M.E.S., Ph.D., Timothy B. Atkeson Visiting Clinical Environmental Lecturer in Law
Jake Sullivan, B.A., M.Phil., J.D., Martin R. Flug Visiting Lecturer in Law
Alexander T. Taubes, B.A., J.D.
Marc Trevino, A.B., J.D.
Thomas Ullmann, B.S., J.D.
Stefan Underhill, B.A., J.D.
John M. Walker, Jr., BA., J.D., George W. and Sadella D. Crawford Visiting Lecturer in Law
Michael M. Wiseman, A.B., J.D.
Allison M. Zieve, A.B., J.D.
David M. Zornow, A.B., J.D.
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